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“SEEING” LIKE A SAGE: THREE TAKES ON
IDENTITY AND PERCEPTION IN EARLY CHINA
For the early Chinese, sagehood represented something of a pre-
occupation. Since the fourth century bce, few ancient thinkers have
refrained from issuing pronouncements about sages—who sages
were, what paths they took to achieve perfection, and even what they
looked like. In addition, early Chinese thinkers also speculated about
how sages “saw.” They asked whether sages were endowed with
extraordinary powers of sight and sound, they contemplated whether
there were things that sages alone were able to detect, and they
debated whether sages detected ruses.
Despite the importance of sagehood—and indeed, recent interest
in the epistemology of the senses—scholars have paid scant attention
to the issue of sagely perception. The topic, for example, is notably
absent from Jane Geaney’s important recent study, On the Epistemol-
ogy of the Senses in Early China.1 Nor does it surface in important
essays on epistemology in Chinese thought by Lisa Raphals, Chris-
toph Harbsmeier, and David Keightley.2 Indeed, with the notable
exception of Mark Csikszentmihalyi’s brief discussion of the problem
in his book, Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China, the
subject has yet to occasion a full-length article or book.3
The omission is somewhat surprising since scholars have been
aware of the linguistic connection between the term for sage (sheng
) and words for aural perception.As Ning Chen observes, sheng was
cognate for “sound” (sheng ) and “to listen” (ting ). The fact that
the sage was something of a perceptual “virtuoso” has moreover been
duly noted. “[F]rom the perspective of ancient Chinese,” Chen writes,
“he who is keen in hearing is at the same time a wise man, able to
distinguish between true and untrue.”4 As Csikszentmihalyi similarly
remarks, Warring States authors understood sagehood not as a “store
of knowledge,” or an ability to impart simple truths (as in ancient
Greece), but as the “consequence of superhuman perceptions.”5
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In part, such an omission owes much to the presentation of sagely
perception in works by Han thinkers. Through acts of omission and
commission, they have played a contributing role in making the
problem of how sages “see” seem either trivial or intellectually
uninteresting. Classical commentators, for example, gloss over the
problem. The cool-headed Zheng Xuan (127–200), for example,
notes simply, “Sages are perspicacious (tong ) and possess fore-
knowledge (xianshi ).”6 Ying Shao (fl. 186–200) offers a
little more detail but nevertheless says little: “Sage: Sound, perspi-
cacious. This is to say that the sage hears a sound and then knows
the truth of matters; he penetrates all of Heaven and Earth and is
clear about the myriad things.”7 Such comments—which omit much
detail and context—leave the impression that the issue was not a
matter of either much controversy or interest. Even the prolix rants
of Wang Chong (27–c.100), who was probably guilty of acts of
commission, do not help matters. To be sure, the Lunheng
does leave tantalizing hints of a number of wild beliefs about sages,
including marvelous powers of prophecy. And the text does adduce
anecdotes about the extraordinary sensory acuity of the sages,
which include the ability to “see through small apertures and per-
ceive the minute.” Nevertheless, Wang’s straw-man presentation of
contemporary beliefs—which he dismisses as the work of the
benighted “literati” and “vulgar”—is suspect.8 Despite the richness
of Wang’s sources, such beliefs appear in the Lunheng as nothing
more than specimens of illogic and superstition. In other words, they
seem to be anything but the product of reasoned debate or serious
theorizing.
What follows below is an attempt to rescue theories of sagely
perceptiveness from scholarly oblivion. Before providing a road map
to the arguments in this article, a few words about the sources to be
examined are in order. To be sure, a comprehensive study of the
problem is not feasible in the context of a single article; we thus
restrict our discussion to three texts: the Xunzi (mid–third
century bce), Lüshi Chunqiu (239 bce), and Huainanzi
(ca. 139 bce).9 Naturally, questions may be raised as to why
we focus on these texts in particular, rather than, say, the Zhuangzi
or Xici . Our reasons for doing so, aside from consid-
erations of space, are twofold. First, to give a sense of the sheer variety
of contemporaneous views about sagely perception, we have chosen
texts that can be dated firmly to within a century of each other. Unlike
the Zhuangzi, the dates of these three texts are the subject of rela-
tively little controversy. Second, comprehensiveness is a criterion.
Certainly, other contemporaneous texts, such as the Han Feizi
(ca. 233 bce), make references to sagely perception; yet the
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discussions of the problem found there is too limited to reconstruct a
coherent theory of how sages “saw.” Alternatively, the Zhuangzi says
much about perception but refrains from producing a systematic
account of what distinguishes the sage’s particular way of perceiving
from other kinds of men. The ideal perceptual agent in the Zhuangzi,
such as Cook Ding, is never referred to explicitly as a sage or some
other kind of perfected being, such as an “Arrived Man” (zhiren )
or “Perfected Man” (zhenren ). Similarly, while the Xici com-
ments on the superior perceptive abilities of the sage, it does not
provide much discussion of how sagely perception is different from
that of other men. Thus, we include here only works that furnish
sustained and explicit discussions of sagely perceptiveness.
In addition, a brief introduction to the words for perception that we
will be using is in order. Early thinkers used a number of words for
“perceiving.” Many of these are related to the sense of vision or
hearing, such as jian , “to see, perceive” and guan “to observe,”
shi “to look at,” ting “to listen to,” and wen “to hear,” etc.10
Other terms express mental forms of perception, and they include:
cha “to investigate, scrutinize,” shen “to examine,” gan “to be
moved by, to feel,” jue “to realize,” etc. In addition, most verbs used
for perception performed double-duty. Such words conveyed both the
literal sense of using the eyes and ears to see and hear, as well as the
more abstract sense of perceiving something with the mind, that is,
knowing. A clear example of this is found in the received version of
the Laozi , where it is said that the sage “does not look out his
window but sees ( jian) the Way of Heaven.” Here, the sage is being
praised for not perceiving the world through the eyes and ears; hence,
the passage must have been referring to a more abstract sense of
perception.11
This article falls into three parts, each of which examines how one
text addressed the following questions: Who was the ultimate percep-
tual agent and what were the sources of sagely perceptiveness? We
open by considering the question in relation to the Xunzi, which
highlights the sage’s unusual and unique perceptiveness with respect
to the large pattern (dali ). As shown below, the differences
between the sage and the rest reflected the former’s clarified heart.
We then turn to the Lüshi Chunqiu, which contrasts the sage’s ability
to discern human intentions from observation with the propensity of
other men to be fooled. According to these authors, the sage’s per-
ceptiveness reflected his attunement to clues, which allowed him to
tease out plots or see through ruses. We then turn to the Huainanzi,
which asserts the sage’s perceptiveness with respect to cosmological
processes and human affairs. Quite paradoxically, the text argues that
the unusual perceptiveness of the sage owed much to the fact that he
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refrained from using the senses. As such, the sage alone retained the
means by which to perceive the Way. Consideration of the evidence
thus reveals a more complicated picture of sagely perceptiveness than
would be suggested by the presentation of Han thinkers. Indeed, the
issue of how a sage “saw” represented a live problem in early China—
one that the best minds of the third and second centuries bce grappled
with and to which they provided contrasting solutions.
I. XUNZI
Let us start with the Xunzi, asking what theories of sagely perceptive-
ness can be found there. Such a question is best answered by address-
ing several smaller issues: First, was in fact the sage the ultimate
perceptual agent? Second, in what ways was the sage a better or ideal
perceptual agent? As will be shown below, the sage is presented as the
ideal perceptual agent in the Xunzi.What distinguished the sage from
others was not sheer sensory acuity, but his unique insight into the
patterns underlying human society.
The sage is represented in the Xunzi as being more perceptive
about human affairs and the Way than other kinds of people. For
example, we read that the sage “cannot be deceived” by false doc-
trines, whereas the multitudes can be “deceived about what they have
seen with their own eyes.”12 The same idea is reiterated elsewhere,
with slight variation: “[The sage] observes the disparate things and is
not deluded.”13 Naturally, all this raises a question about whether
perceptiveness is associated just with the sage—what about, for
example, the gentleman ( junzi ) or the well-born shi ? Here the
text of the Xunzi, however, suggests that exceptional perceptiveness
was a special attribute of the sage alone: “To conduct oneself in
accordance with good models is the shi.To behave in ways that reflect
steadfast earnestness is the gentleman. To be inexhaustible in one’s
all-encompassing clear-sightedness is the sage.”14
Naturally, one might argue that the fact that the Xunzi associated
sages with unusual perceptiveness requires little explanation. After
all, was not sagehood synonymous with unusual perceptiveness or
discernment, as mentioned above? Certainly, sages are associated
with special perceptiveness in many early texts, notably, the Wuxing-
pian , which was excavated from a fourth-century bce site.15
Yet interestingly, early authors were not uniform in associating sages
with special perceptiveness. The authors of the Zuo Zhuan
, the Gongyang Zhuan , and Guliang Zhuan
did not explicitly do so.16 More tellingly, the Mencius (fourth to third
century bce) allows for the possibility that the sage could be a poten-
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tially poor judge of character; after all, the Duke of Zhou was
betrayed by a treacherous brother.17
Perhaps then the emphasis on sagely perceptiveness can be
explained as a rhetorical device? Some of the work may indeed have
been intended for a royal or noble audience to win continued favor or
even official employment. It was thus in the interest of the authors of
the Xunzi to flatter the vanity of the ruler (who was most likely
anything but sagacious). And this could be accomplished by speaking
of the sage (sheng) as the ideal ruler, since sheng performed double-
duty in ancient China.Aside from being a term for a kind of cultivated
person, it also was used as a part of an honorific address for people
in court (“your sagacity”). By speaking of sages, the vanity of the
ruler could be flattered by exploiting the ambiguity of the term while
explaining how states ought to be governed.18
Not everything should be chalked up to rhetorical context,
however. As will be demonstrated below, the Xunzi offers an elabo-
rate account of the differences between what sages can perceive about
the world and what can be perceived by others. Indeed, the elaborate-
ness of the account leads us to suspect that there was a substantial
theory behind assertions of the sage’s unusual perceptiveness, one
meriting further investigation.
What were the sources of the sage’s unusual perceptiveness? One
possibility, suggested by the work of the eminent historian of science,
Steven Shapin, is that a distinction should be drawn between more or
less competent perceptual agents.Whereas for some people the world
of sight and sound was a reliable source of knowledge, others were
incapable of perceiving “that which was available to be experienced,
and thus reported upon.”19 Certainly, a number of passages would
suggest that such a distinction applied; consider the following
anecdote:
South of Xiashou was a man there named Juan Shuliang. He was the
kind of person that was foolish and easily frightened. There was a
bright moon and he was walking in the night; looking down, he saw
his shadow, mistaking it for a crouching ghost. Looking up, he saw his
own hair, mistaking it for a standing devil.20
To be sure, the Xunzi is not suggesting that the senses are misleading
or systematically distorting “things as they are in themselves.”21
According to Keightley, the text is calling attention to the propensity
of people to misinterpret the information presented by their eyes and
ears—that is, problems that occur in processing or identifying what is
seen and heard. By Geaney’s account, passages such as this illustrate
how the authors of the Xunzi believed that certain influences con-
tribute to sensory error or instances in which “sensory attention is
misdirected.”22
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Certainly, the Xunzi acknowledges the possibility of sensory errors.
There are indeed circumstances (shi ) that makes it difficult for the
senses to work properly. To cite an example from the Jiebi
chapter, if one walks in the dark, then a reclining stone will appear to
be a crouching tiger, or a row of trees will appear like a group of men
following behind. If the eyeballs are pressed, one will see one, instead
of two, objects; likewise, by cupping the hands over the ears, one hears
sharp dins as opposed to dull noises.23
Aside from extreme circumstances that make it difficult for a
person to perceive the world correctly, the Xunzi also cites more
systematic problems, including what we would call emotional or
mental imbalance. Such imbalances were seen as leading to the senses
being misdirected.24 Drunks, the text points out, will leap a chasm of
a hundred paces because they mistake it for a half step. And this
occurs because wine can disorder the spirit. Disordering the spirit, the
Xunzi further notes, is no different from other actions that disable the
senses. More seriously, having a heart that is unsettled will make it
impossible for a person to determine clearly what he is seeing. In
addition, suffering from muddled thoughts prevents a person from
determining what does or does not exist.25 For this reason, people
“deem that they see ghosts in the midst of confusion or at times when
they are in doubt or are bewildered.”26
Although the Xunzi acknowledges that sensory errors were
possible, such errors were not regarded as especially common or
serious—a fact that suggests that most people were not seen as incom-
petent perceptual agents. Certainly, emotional imbalance or other
circumstances could occasionally lead to mistaking a stone for a
crouching tiger. But the text stops short of suggesting that people
usually fail to make out objects. On the contrary, such sensory errors
represent, as Geaney would put it, rare occurrences.27 To use an
example from the Xunzi, if we look up at a forest from the top of a
hill, the biggest trees appear no taller than chopsticks; yet because of
the heart’s oversight, no one mistakes trees for chopsticks, since they
realize that the viewer’s height obscures the actual size of the trees.28
Such discussions implicitly recognize that most people are competent
perceptual agents—that is, they see and hear well enough to go about
their daily affairs.To put it somewhat differently, one does not have to
be a sage to realize that large trees appear small from distances.
To explain why the sage was more perceptive than other people, we
must go beyond the dichotomy of competence and incompetence by
asking why the sage represented a good, rather than merely compe-
tent, perceptual agent. As such, it is necessary to distinguish between
objects of perception. As will be shown below, the Xunzi certainly
distinguished between the ability to perceive mundane objects in the
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world, on the one hand, and the capacity for discerning the truth of
matters or acquiring insight of underlying patterns (li ), on the
other. Before going too much further, it is worth saying something
about what the patterns were. Admittedly, the Xunzi is vague about
this. Yet as Eric Hutton and others argue, the Xunzi uses the term to
refer to a variety of things. On a smaller scale, the patterns entail
mundane things in the world, such as the behavioral patterns of earth-
worms, and on a larger scale, they include cosmic patterns. On a still
larger scale, the patterns—most often referred to as the “large” or
“larger” patterns—refer to the Way, which the Xunzi interprets as
providing a basis for human morality and social organization.29 As we
will see below, whereas most people had few problems perceiving
mundane objects in the world and even potentially some cosmic
processes, the Xunzi saw them as largely “blind with respect to the
large pattern” or the Way (an yu dali ).30 Such blindness, we
further learn, was the reason why his contemporaries followed the
pernicious doctrines of the hundred persuaders, experts of statecraft,
and other notable thinkers, including Mozi (fifth to fourth
century) and Mencius.31 In other words, such blindness explained why
humans were confused about morality.
Let us begin with an obvious explanation of the sage’s unusual
perceptiveness. Perhaps the sage was more perceptive because he sees
and hears literally better than others? Such an interpretation has its
advantages. At the very least, it sits well with previous accounts of
sagehood, which tend to depict sages as beings endowed with special
aural skills or even extraordinary sensory acuity.32 In addition, this
explanation would be consistent with the picture found in other early
texts, including the Neiye (fifth to fourth century bce) chapter
of the Guanzi , where self-cultivation and moral perfection are
seen as leading to sharper faculties of sight and hearing, and ulti-
mately, to comprehensive knowledge of the world.33
Interestingly, the Xunzi offers little evidence that the sage is more
perceptive about the world because he is endowed with special
sensory acuity. To be sure, a few passages in the Xunzi link keen
hearing and clear eyesight (congming ) to sagely wisdom (sheng
zhi ).34 Yet questions linger about whether such references are
anything more than conventional metaphors. More problematically,
the few passages in which the text comments upon the sage’s eyes and
ears suggest that he was not distinguished by any kind of special
sensory acuity:
The eyes differentiate between white and black, and between the
beautiful and the ugly. The ears differentiate between sound quality
and pitch, and between clearness and muddiness; the mouth
differentiates between the sour, salty, sweet, and bitter; the nose
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differentiates between the sweet smelling and fragrant and the putrid
and foul. The skeleton, trunk, and the patterns of the skin differen-
tiate between hot and cold, and between the painful and itchy. This is
that which men are always born having, it is that which is not con-
tingent on other things, and that in which the [sage] Yu and the
[tyrant] Jie were alike.35
Admittedly, the passage does not rule out the possibility that the sage
might see and hear better than others. That said, this is clearly not a
point of emphasis. If anything, the text seems to be downplaying such
differences in the interest of highlighting commonalities between all
kinds of men. What is more, other passages state outright that height-
ened sensory acuity cannot be achieved through self-cultivation. In
this connection, the Xunzi observes, “It is manifest that the clear-
sightedness of the eyes and the keenness of the ears cannot be
[acquired] through study.”36
Instead, the Xunzi proposes that the sage’s special perceptiveness
owes much to the fact that his heart is in its ideal state.There, sages are
defined as “numinous and fortified”; their hearts furthermore are said
to be fully balanced and receptive to new impressions.37 Additionally,
the sage is free from the “obscuration” or “blinding” of the heart, as he
has “purified it and rectified his senses.”38
According to the Jiebi chapter, such perceptiveness allowed the
sage to order the human realm more effectively because it gave him
insight into cosmic patterns. As the text puts it: “When a person has
achieved clarity and brightness, none of the forms of the myriad things
are not visible; of those seen, none of them are not categorized (lun
).”39 To be sure, being perceptive of the myriad things and cosmic
patterns was not an end in itself. In Tianlun , the authors insist,
“Only the sage does not act to seek knowledge of Heaven.”40 In other
words, such perceptiveness is to be valued only where benefits to the
social order can be obtained. This idea is reiterated elsewhere in the
Jiebi chapter where the text stresses that the sage’s perceptiveness of
cosmic patterns makes him more effective at bringing order and pros-
perity to humans:
He observes distinctly the myriad things, thereby becoming aware of
their characteristics, he deliberates and ascertains [the causes] behind
order and chaos, thereby penetrating their system (?)41; he gives
order to heaven and earth, thereby discerning the characteristics and
uses of the myriad things [i.e., for humans]; he cuts and divides the
large pattern and thus the cosmos is fully ordered.42
What set sagely perception apart from that of ordinary humans,
if anything? Interestingly, the sage was not presented as having par-
ticularly acute senses in the Xunzi. Although the author acknowl-
edged the possibility of sensory errors and took care to explain their
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potential sources, the text stops short of suggesting that such errors
prevented most people from acquiring knowledge about mundane
aspects of the world. Instead, what distinguished the sage from most
people was his power to distinguish true from false doctrines. Such a
power, finally, owed everything to the sage’s perceptiveness of nor-
mative patterns that underlay the human order. To put it somewhat
differently, whereas the ordinary mortal was unable to grasp fully the
essentials of human morality and social organization, the sage alone
had insight into the Way because he possessed an unbiased, clarified
heart.
II. LÜSHI CHUNQIU
We now turn to the Lüshi Chunqiu, asking of it the same questions
raised earlier about the Xunzi—to wit, who was seen as the best
perceptual agent? And how was such an agent different from others?
As before, the sage is treated in the Lüshi Chunqiu as the best per-
ceptual agent; sages alone could discern hidden schemes and under-
lying character through observation in situations where ordinary men
would be fooled or remain in ignorance. Yet, the picture of sagely
perceptiveness found in the Lüshi Chunqiu differs from that of the
Xunzi on several counts. For a start, there is the question of what the
sage was supposed to perceive (or better still, what sorts of things he
alone was capable of perceiving). As we have seen in the Xunzi, the
sage was distinguished by his ability to perceive underlying patterns.
By contrast, foreknowledge of secret schemes and hidden intentions
is highlighted in the Lüshi Chunqiu to a much greater extent. What is
more, the authors provide a contrasting explanation of why sages
perceive better. Whereas the Xunzi argued that the unusual percep-
tiveness of sages resulted from having a clarified heart, the Lüshi
Chunqiu highlighted the sage’s attunement to subtle details or exter-
nal clues (wei and biao ).
At first glance, the Lüshi Chunqiu seems to offer little information
about early Chinese attitudes toward sensory knowledge. Instead of
discussing the reliability of the senses, the text focuses on the threat
posed by the senses to the cohesiveness or health of the body.43 This
does not mean, however, that epistemological concerns were absent
from the text. On the contrary, we find a different kind of epistemo-
logical problem than the ones found in ancient Greece. More often
than not, the major question in the Lüshi chunqiu was not whether the
senses dissembled, but whether men and women did, and who could
tell. Indeed, the problem of how observation could yield reliable
information about other minds represents a significant theme there.
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Turning to the main subject of this article, let us ask who the best
perceptual agent was supposed to be. Or to put it in the terms of the
Lüshi Chunqiu:Was the sage the only one who could discern the truth
of the human heart from observation? After all, it is one thing to
argue that sages were apt interpreters of human behavior, but it is
another to say that such an ability was attributed exclusively to sages.
As it turns out, the evidence suggests the latter: Extraordinary clear-
sightedness, we will argue below, was associated only with sages in the
Lüshi Chunqiu, rather than with other kinds of virtuous men, includ-
ing worthies (xianzhe ) or gentlemen.
More importantly, perceptiveness with respect to human intentions
is treated as a litmus test of sagehood in at least one apocryphal
anecdote concerning Lord Huan of Qi and his sagacious min-
ister, Guan Zhong (also known as Guanzi , d. ca. 645 bce).
The pair had been plotting to attack the state of Ju , but their plans
became widely known before they could be carried out. Taken aback,
Guan remarked, “There must be a sage in the state.” Lord Huan
thereupon guessed that the sage must have been one of the workers
outside of the palace. The next day, the pair summoned the worker
and asked him how he knew about the planned attack. The worker
explained that the gentleman has three kinds of expressions. One was
of pleasure, befitting someone listening to music; the second was of
sorrow, appropriate for someone wearing the garments of mourning,
and the last was of anger, of someone about to go to war. He then
went on to explain how this related to his specific observations of the
pair:
The other day, your servant had espied from afar your lordship on
top of the terrace, abounding with rage. [The movement of] your
lordship’s hands and feet were restrained—the appearance of
someone [about to go] to war. Your lordship opened his mouth but
did not close it. Thus, that which he was saying was “Ju.” Your lord-
ship also raised his arm, pointing. What he faced was the state of Ju.
Your servant secretly thought that the lord who had been disobedi-
ent could only be that of the state of Ju; thus he spoke of this matter.44
This anecdote reveals several points of interest. To begin, it confirms
what Geoffrey Lloyd has argued. There was not as in ancient Greece
an “ontological divide between the intelligible and the perceptible
domains, or between being and becoming.” Instead, it was possible to
move down a “continuum” from the world of manifest phenomena, as
Lloyd would put it, to the world of the hidden or formless through
inferences drawn from observation.45 Yet the ability to perceive the
hidden or formless—here, represented by secret plots—was not
something everyone was thought to be capable of. Instead, as Guan
Zhong’s reactions reveal, it was unique to sages. As the text puts it in
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the concluding remarks about the episode,“The sage hears that which
is without sound and sees that which is without form.”46
Having settled the issue of who the good perceptual agent was, we
turn to our second question, namely, why sages were uniquely percep-
tive with respect to human affairs? Several possibilities, which will be
examined below, present themselves: First, the sage’s unusual percep-
tiveness was a reflection of his sensory acuity. A sage perceived things
in a more complete way because he literally saw and heard better. A
second possibility—which requires that we distinguish perceptiveness
from simple sensory acuity—is that the sage was more perceptive
because he was more discerning with his observations. He noticed
details that other people ignored, or he was able to draw the right
kinds of inferences from what was seen or heard by everyone.
Let us consider the first possibility, that is, the sage’s unusual per-
ceptiveness owed something to his extraordinary sensory acuity. Such
an explanation is plausible, since some textual support can be found.
In one place, the authors say that the sage “makes his spirit harmo-
nized, his eyes clear-sighted, his ears keen, his nose sensitive, and his
mouth nimble.”47 The reason why the eyes and ears of sages surpassed
those of others, the text explains, had to do with the fact that sages
refrained from overusing them.48
Although sensory acuity was certainly one component that
explained the sage’s perceptiveness, it appears not to have been the
only explanation provided by the Lüshi Chunqiu, nor the most impor-
tant. As we will see below, the authors also explained the sage’s
unusual perceptiveness by his ability to notice clues that were ordi-
narily overlooked or misinterpreted by others. The authors high-
lighted two kinds of clues in particular: the subtle (wei) and external
signs or cues (biao/zheng ). Often depicted as details easy to miss or
behavior difficult to interpret, clues made the difference between a
partial understanding of human affairs, on the one hand, and the
infallible perceptiveness of the sage, on the other.
Let us start with the issue of subtle details, which are depicted by
the authors as providing sages with foreknowledge of events to come.
One passage, found in a chapter entitled “Scrutinizing the Subtle”
(Cha Wei ), provides an illustration of this view:
If [the signs of] order and chaos and of survival and destruction were
like the differences between the highest mountains and the deepest
streams, if they were like the differences between white chalk and
black paint, then there would be no place to use wisdom; instead,
the foolish would be sufficient [for determining such things from
signs]. . . . Thus, the knowledgeable shi and worthies put together
their thoughts and anxiously ponder in search [of such signs], and yet
there was the affair of Guan and Cai [i.e., two royal uncles who
rebelled against the Western Zhou king] and the disobedient plot of
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the Eastern Yi and the eight states. Indeed, the signs of order and
chaos and of survival and destruction are in the beginning like
autumn hairs. If one scrutinizes autumn hairs, then there will be
nothing missed with respect to all under Heaven.49
Several points can be culled from the passage. Immediately, the politi-
cal nature of the good perceptual agent’s quest for knowledge is
striking. At stake here is not whether he can know of future hurri-
canes or comets, but whether he can tease out the signs of imminent
rebellions. Also worth pointing out is what might be called the
authors’ optimism: The roots of human disaster and fortune can
always be known ahead of time so long as one is attentive to subtle
signs of trouble. Yet interestingly, such optimism is offset by the
awareness of the practical difficulties of noticing such signs, a point
that is underscored by the comparison of the subtle to “autumn hairs.”
(On this point, the text recalls the Laozi, which describes the subtle as
that which “one grasps but does not get.”)50 Catching the subtle is so
difficult that the congresses of the knowledgeable or worthy are insuf-
ficient for discovering treacherous plots. This brings us to another
point, namely, who can catch the “autumn hairs” or possess fore-
knowledge of human events. Although the authors do not say explic-
itly that the sage alone can know, this is strongly implied. As other
passages in the Lüshi Chunqiu make clear, foreknowledge, or knowl-
edge of “a thousand ages past and a thousand ages to come,” is what
sets the sage apart from other kinds of men.51
Naturally, the idea that foreknowledge was acquired by scrutinizing
the subtle was not new or unique to the Lüshi Chunqiu. It can also be
found in other third-century classics of statecraft, such as the Han
Feizi.52 Some incarnation of the idea, moreover, had been in circula-
tion for a long time. Certainly, there are hints of this view in the Laozi,
where the author notes, “Seeing the small is what is called clear-
sighted.”53 There are also indications that such an idea derived from
traditions of divination. For example, the Xici treats subtle or infini-
tesimal signs, including astrological omens, as carrying premonitions
of the future.54 Interestingly, the Xici depicts subtle signs as being
interpretable by gentlemen, as well as sages.55 Though less accom-
plished, gentlemen too could decipher clues. They “know of the
minute and the obvious” (zhi wei zhi zhang ) and can also
“observe the traces” (guan xiang ).56
What perhaps was new to the Lüshi Chunqiu was the emphasis on
what the authors called external signs. This is the idea that sages have
a complete understanding of other minds because they know how to
discern the truths hidden behind things that were obvious to all. This
view is exemplified in one chapter:
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The hearts of men are concealed and hard to see; profound, they are
hard to fathom. Thus the sage scrutinizes the intentions [of others]
through what they do. The way in which a sage surpasses other men
is with his foreknowledge. To possess foreknowledge, one must scru-
tinize external signs and cues. Without external signs and cues to
know things ahead of time, Yao and Shun [i.e., two ancient sage
kings] would be no different from the multitudes. Clues vary and
signs are hard [to grasp]; yet the sage is not flustered but the multi-
tudes lack the means to grasp their meaning.57
It would be useful to draw out several relevant points. The authors
open by suggesting that clues like external signs and cues can tip the
observer off to the hidden thoughts of others. Such clues, however,
are opaque; their meaning cannot be grasped through casual obser-
vation or by the multitudes (zhongren ). In fact, the author
emphasizes that the meaning of these clues can only be understood
by sages.
Our foregoing discussion leaves us with the question of what
counted as external signs? For the answer, we will have to turn to an
anecdote, which reveals how signs, though visible to everyone, are
properly perceived by very few. Once again, the machinations of
Lord Huan and Guan Zhong take center stage. The pair had
planned to attack Wei because the Wei emissary arrived late to a
meeting of the overlords. When Lord Huan retreated to his private
chambers, his consort (from Wei) went to the foot of the hall,
begging forgiveness for her home state. Taken aback, Lord Huan
protested that he had no business with Wei. The woman, however,
retorted,
Your concubine espied from afar your lordship entering, with his
stride high and his qi abundant—a sign that he had the intention
of attacking a state. When he saw his concubine, his appearance
changed; this was a sign that he was going to attack the state of Wei.
The next day, the lord called over Guan Zhong, prompting Guan to
ask him if he had abandoned his plans to attack Wei. Surprised, the
lord then asked Guan how he knew this. “The way in which your
lordship paid his salutations and held court,” Guan replied, “was
respectful and his manner of speaking was slow. When he saw his
servant, he took on a shamefaced look, and this is how your servant
knew of it.”58
To be sure, some readers will wonder whether the story is specifi-
cally about the sage’s ability to grasp the meaning of manifest signs. In
other words, how do we know that either Guan Zhong or the consort
were sages? With respect to Guan, the answer is fairly obvious.
Though Guan was sometimes depicted in unflattering ways in other
texts, such as the Mencius, he is certainly presented as a sagely adviser
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throughout the Lüshi Chunqiu.59 Matters are more complicated in the
case of the consort, who is otherwise a murky figure. In this connec-
tion, several points merit consideration. First, this anecdote appears
in a chapter that illustrates specifically the sage’s ability to grasp
things through nonverbal or “subtle” communication ( jingyu ).
Indeed, this woman is treated as belonging to the same category as
Confucius. In addition, the anecdote fits the aforementioned descrip-
tion of the sage’s interpretation of signs. Here, the sage’s recognition
of some sign affords her with knowledge of the hidden thoughts of
others. In this case, the signs are none other than Lord Huan’s pace,
facial expression, and tone of voice. All of these things, of course, are
far from invisible; nevertheless, they are decipherable only to the sage.
The authors of the Lüshi Chunqiu were optimists. In their view, the
truth of matters—at least with respect to the thoughts and feelings of
others—could be known through observation. In other words, the
world of sight and sound did indeed represent a reliable source of
information about people so long as the observer was attentive to
subtle details, his senses acute, and his interpretation of manifest
phenomena correct. Yet from another perspective, it may be argued
that the authors of the Lüshi Chunqiu, like those of the Xunzi, were
pessimistic about what could be known by most people. As with the
Xunzi, the differences between what could be known by ordinary
people, on the one hand, and by the sage, on the other, did not boil
down to the ability to perceive mundane objects in the world. Rather,
such differences had to do with the sorts of inferences about the world
one could draw from what was seen or heard—in the case of the Lüshi
Chunqiu, the sage was distinguished by his ability to detect human
schemes and character from clues. Such clues allowed him to come to
a complete understanding of human affairs and to glimpse the unfold-
ing of events yet to come.
III. HUANANZI
We now turn to our final text, the Huainanzi. As will be shown
presently, the good perceptual agent was none other than the sage (or,
in some passages, an equivalent figure).60 Sages there are not only
exceptionally clear-sighted with respect to human affairs, but also
extraordinarily perceptive about all things in the world, including the
ineffable Way. That said, the picture of sagely perceptiveness found in
the Huainanzi departs from the ones found in texts examined above.
Whereas the Xunzi and Lüshi Chunqiu treat the eyes and ears as the
source of knowledge about the world and even the Way, the Huain-
anzi argues something different. Sages perceive the world better than
654 miranda brown and uffe bergeton
others because they shut down their senses and preserve their essence
( jing ) and spirit (shen ), thereby intuiting the Way.
To address the first of our concerns (i.e., the identity of the
good perceptual agent), the answer for the Huainanzi seems fairly
straightforward. At least with respect to objects in the world, the sage
or some equivalent figure is undeniably the best perceptual agent. As
with the Lüshi Chunqiu, the sage is depicted throughout the Huain-
anzi as being uniquely clear-sighted, even prescient, with respect to
human affairs: “Unless one is a numinous or sagely person, it is
impossible to distinguish between [the signs of human fortune and
disaster].”61 What is more, sages see through ruses, an ability that no
doubt had its political applications. Comparing the sage’s powers of
discernment to the ability of legendary artisans to detect fakes, the
authors assert that whereas the “muddle-headed ruler” would be led
astray, sages alone are able to discern the character of “treacherous
ministers, petty men, and false gentlemen.”62 Additionally, the Huain-
anzi credits the sage with general perceptiveness: “Because [the
sage’s] essence and spirit are abundant, his qi does not dissipate; and
thus in hearing there is nothing he does not hear and in seeing there
is nothing he does not see.”63
Having shown that the sage was seen as the best perceptual agent
in the text, we now turn to the more complicated problem—namely,
how the authors accounted for the sage’s unusual perceptiveness? As
would be expected, some of the explanations found in earlier texts
surface in the Huainanzi. One possibility, which recalls the discussion
of the Xunzi, is that the sage’s heart is free of disruptive influences,
such as biases; hence, he is able to perceive the world as it is. Some-
thing like this is suggested below:
Knowledge is the store of the heart. When knowledge is universal,
then the heart will be level. No one makes a mirror from running or
turbid water; one makes mirrors instead from water that has stopped,
because it is still. Likewise, no one examines one’s form with crude
iron; rather, one examines oneself in a polished mirror due to its
evenness. Only when the heart is level and still can it reveal the
nature of things.64
In addition to this explanation, there are indications that the authors
of the Huainanzi thought that the sage’s unusual perceptiveness
reflected his attunement to clues. This explanation has its merits; at
the very least, the authors of the Huainanzi comment repeatedly on
how “only the sage is aware of the subtle” or how “the sage is cautious
of the minute and mindful of the subtle.”65 Yet aside from such com-
ments, little else is said about the sage’s attunement to the subtle or
the importance of ridding the heart of biases, leading one to suspect
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that they were not the focus of the Huainanzi’s discussion of sagely
perceptiveness.
Sensory acuity—that is, being able to see and hear literally better
than others—represents another possible source of the sage’s unusual
perceptiveness.66 Much is certainly made of sages having “ears and
eyes that are clear, hearing and sight that is keen and sharp.”67 Also,
one passage hints that sensory acuity was connected to greater per-
ceptiveness about the world:
If covetous desires are few, the eyes and ears will be clear, the sight
and hearing sharp and keen. When the sight is sharp and the hearing
is keen, this is what is called clear-sightedness . . .68
Although this passage mentions sensory acuity in relation to self-
cultivation, it is unclear whether it is the source of the sage’s unusual
perceptiveness about the world. Much depends on how the reference
to “clear-sightedness” (ming ) should be taken. Does “clear-
sightedness” here refer literally to being able to see well; or can it
be understood more metaphorically, meaning to be discerning or
intelligent?
Other evidence, however, suggests that sensory acuity is not the
sole explanation. This is because the authors of the Huainanzi ques-
tioned whether the information from the senses could provide com-
plete knowledge about the Way, which was regarded as being more
than what could be seen and touched directly. Quoting the Laozi,
they observed: “One can look at it [i.e., the Way] but not see its
form, listen to it but not hear its sound, stroke it but fail to get it,
and observe it but be unable to exhaust it.”69 The same idea appears
in other passages, where the authors play on the two senses of
“clear-sightedness”: “Those who employ their eyes and ears to see
and hear tire their forms (i.e., their bodies) but are not clear-
sighted.”70
If sensory acuity was not behind the sage’s extraordinary percep-
tiveness, what was? The answer to this question comes in the form of
a familiar paradox: Sages and other perfected humans perceive the
world better than other men because they do not use their eyes and
ears to see—or, as the Laozi puts it, the sage is one who “does not
look but is clear-sighted.”71 For example, in one passage, the authors
encourage men to follow sages in shutting down their eyes and ears:
“Close up the nine apertures, seal the will and intentions, abandon the
keenness and clear-sightedness [of the eyes and ears], and return to
that-without-awareness.”72
Perhaps the injunctions to shut down the senses reflect a lack of
consistency on the part of the authors? Certainly, the Huainanzi is
an encyclopedic compilation—the work of multiple authors, who
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may have introduced potentially contradictory strands of thinking.
Despite its composite structure, other studies have suggested that
the Huainanzi can in fact be read as a coherent whole.73 Equally
important, the text offers a solution to the apparent quandary. As
seen below, its authors argue that the sage could preserve his
essence and spirit and ultimately acquire superior powers of percep-
tion by shutting down the senses. The most explicit statement of this
view is presented in a passage that elaborates on ideas found in the
Laozi:
This is to say that when the essence and spirit dissipates to the
outside [i.e., in the process of perceiving], the [faculties] of knowl-
edge and reflection quake within and cannot fill up and order the
form. As such, the spirit will be deployed far away, and what is left
[i.e., the body] will be close.Thus [it is said of the sage],“One does not
go outside one’s door to know all under Heaven; one does not look
through one’s window to know the Way of Heaven. The further one
goes, the less one knows.”74
Here, two themes come together: the need to refrain from sensory
stimulation and the preservation of the essence and spirit. This,
however, leaves us with the question of what was the connection
between “knowing the conditions of all under Heaven,” on the one
hand, and refraining from sensory stimulation, on the other? For
answers, we have to look elsewhere in the Huainanzi. To begin with,
bear in mind that the authors thought, as Harold Roth has pointed
out, that too much sensory stimulation could lead the essence and
spirit to leave the body:“If [the essence and spirit] leaves the body for
long and do not return, the form (i.e., the body) will close its internal
openings, and the spirit will be without a way to enter.”75 Also worth
noting is the fact that the authors regarded the spirit as the “source of
knowledge”—and not any kind of knowledge, but knowledge of the
ineffable Way.76 As the authors put it,“Relying on the spirit residing in
the efficacious repository [i.e., the heart], the sage thus returns to the
beginning of things, observing where it is dark and listening where
there is no sound.”77
As with the earlier texts surveyed above, the sage was the ultimate
perceptual agent. Not only is the sage uniquely clear-sighted about
human affairs, but he can also perceive the basic patterns of the
cosmos. Yet there were also differences. Whereas the earlier texts
would argue that the sage “sees” better because he makes more
effective use of the information from his senses, the Huainanzi went
so far as to question the value of sensory knowledge and conventional
ways of apprehending the world altogether. Most strikingly, it stressed
the importance of shutting down the senses to protect the spirit, the
means by which one perceived the Way.
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IV. Conclusion
In the pages above, we have made a first attempt to address a curious
lacuna in the field—namely, the lack of substantive discussion about
early Chinese theories of sagely perceptiveness. While our discussion
does not pretend to be a comprehensive treatment of the subject, it
nevertheless aims to reveal the extent to which the issue had captured
the imagination of early Chinese thinkers. In addition, the issue of
how sages “saw” represented something more than a general belief or
cultural assumption, as the comments of Han thinkers or traditional
etymology might suggest. On the contrary, early thinkers produced
varied and diverging accounts of the sources of the sage’s special
perceptiveness. For the Xunzi, “seeing” like a sage meant ridding
oneself of disruptive influences, thereby allowing the heart to register
the information from the senses and to perceive the patterns under-
lying human society. For the Lüshi Chunqiu, it required special attun-
ement to subtle details and telling clues, which enabled sages to pierce
through the veil of appearance. For the Huainanzi, the sage’s “seeing”
necessitated shutting down the senses altogether and preserving the
spirit in order to intuit the Way.
Our foregoing discussion leaves us with a question—namely, why
did some thinkers choose not to join our authors in singling out the
sage for his special perceptiveness? As we have noted above, the
Zhuangzi highlighted the special perceptiveness of Cook Ding—but
without sharply delineating the perceptive abilities of the sage from
others. While this question lies outside the scope of this essay, we
would like to venture a few preliminary thoughts in closing. One
possibility is that such differences speak to the diverging agendas of
the authors. Perhaps the focus on the sage’s exclusive ability to per-
ceive normative patterns reflected a larger defense of tradition within
the Xunzi against its detractors? After all, the traditional rites and
institutions enshrined the normative patterns of the sage. And if
indeed the sage alone could perceive such patterns, we can see the
necessity of preserving, rather than changing or rejecting, such tradi-
tions. Similarly, we may explain the interest in distinguishing sagely
perception from that of ordinary mortals in terms of more basic
emphasis on sagely exceptionalism in the Lüshi Chunqiu. Interest-
ingly, the sages of the Lüshi Chunqiu seemed to have been born, not
made. Such sages included children and illiterate field workers—in
other words, individuals who were prodigies rather than the benefi-
ciaries of extensive periods of ethical training. Finally, perhaps texts
that refrained from elaborating on the differences between human
and sagely perception see sages and ordinary mortals on a smoother
continuum? To return to Wang Chong, might we see his denial that
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sages saw and heard better as part of a larger attack on sagely author-
ity?78 After all, Wang had noted that such beliefs about sages led his
contemporaries to turn away from the testimony of their own eyes
and ears. Complained Wang, “The age puts faith in empty and false
documents, esteeming what they learn [literally: what they have
heard] while denigrating what they see.”79 More problematically, such
beliefs led to blind faith in old books, books that contained theories
that contradicted common sense and personal experience: “They
believe that those things put down to writing on bamboo and silk
represent the traditions of the sages and worthies and thus contain
nothing false.”80 Admittedly, much more work will be necessary to
bear out what we have only been able to allude to in brief. In order to
understand why different thinkers articulated diverging positions on
sagely perception, we will have to know more about the varied con-
ceptions of sagehood more generally—in particular, who the sages
were, whether they were born with exceptional qualities, and what
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